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In recent years, a series of social protests such as the “Sunflower StudentMovement” in Taiwan and the “Umbrella Movement” in Hong Kong havesparked concerns over the political atmosphere in the Greater China Re-
gion. Compared with Taiwan and Hong Kong, the people of Macao have long
been considered politically apathetic, with a low level of political awareness
and efficacy. When asked whether they would oppose the government if
their interests had been seriously infringed, around 40% of respondents
chose to remain silent, perhaps out of a desire for “social harmony,” whereas
92.1% had no experience of engagement in any social movement. (1) It
therefore came as a surprise when 20,000 people took to the streets on
25 May 2014 to protest against a bill that would have given generous ben-
efits packages to outgoing Chief Executives (CEs) and top officials. In what
was regarded as the biggest march since the 1999 handover, this excep-
tional scenario reveals the existence of a civic culture among the youth of
Macao.
This unprecedented social force pushed the Macao Special Administrative
Region (MSAR) government to drop the controversial package and marked
a milestone in the civil rights movement against social injustice. However,
the movement also pointed to two more fundamental issues that remain
unresolved. The first is the lack of separation between the legislative and
executive powers. (2) The second is extensive self-censorship in the main-
stream media, leading young people and professionals to share messages
of criticism and calls for direct action through online media. In general, this
march is considered to have laid the groundwork for future democratic
movements. 
This essay will focus on this significant social protest, reveal the challenges
faced by democrats, and describe the change in political culture among the
people of Macao, especially youngsters. 
The welfare package
The MSAR government submitted the bill on “Welfare Package for Desig-
nated, Incumbent and Former CEs and Principal Officials” (houren xianren
ji liren xingzheng changguan ji zhuyao guanyuan de baozhang zhidu 
候任、現任及離任行政長官及主要官員的保障制度) to the Legislative As-
sembly (AL in portuguese) and won general approval on 16 December 2013,
and then planned to win the article-by-article vote (xizexing biaojue 細則
性表決) for final approval on 27 May 2014. (3)
The bill proposes that former CEs should receive a monthly payment equal
to 70% of their last monthly salary before leaving their position. The top
nine officials should be given one-off compensation of 14% of the monthly
salary of former civil servants and 30% for those originally from the private
sector multiplied by the number of months they have worked for the gov-
ernment. In addition, the bill also provides a retroactive period until the
year of 2000, which means that former CEs and top officials can also enjoy
the benefits. Moreover, the bill proposes to give the CE immunity from crim-
inal prosecution during his or her term of office.
Supporting views on the package
The government claimed this bill was essential because senior officials
would be barred from taking up jobs in the private sector during the first
year after leaving their principal positions. (4) Supporters such as Ho Iat-seng,
the president of the AL, insisted that the bill was necessary due to the need
to set up a retirement protection system for principal officials. (5) Chan Chak-
mo, the president of the second permanent committee, claimed that crim-
inal immunity was essential because it was impossible for the CE to go to
court frequently during his or her tenure. (6) Fong Chi-keong, an appointed
legislator, stated that society should be more generous, and he personally
wished to further enhance the compensation proportion. (7) Jose Chui Sai-
peng, an indirectly-elected legislator and the cousin of CE Fernando Chui
Sai-on, expressed his concern that only “crazy people” or “liars” would be
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attracted to the government’s top positions if the compensation system
was not in place. (8) Chan Pou-sam, the vice-chairman of the Macao Jiang-
men Communal Society (Aomen Jiangmen tongxianghui 澳門江門同鄉會),
who organised a demonstration with 1,000 participants to support the pro-
posal, commented that not only ordinary residents but also high-ranking
officials contributed to the rapid development of Macao, so Macao should
reward their diligence by improving their benefits. (9)
Opposing views on the package
Au Kam-san, a directly-elected legislator, condemned the introduction of
this controversial bill without public consultation and by relying only on
pro-government forces to pass the bill in the AL. (10) This was inconsistent
with Fernando Chui’s continuous highlighting of his governing philosophy
of “sunshine government” (yangguang zhengfu 陽光政府), which empha-
sised transparency and “scientific administration” (kexue shizheng 科學施
政), including public consultation. 
The opposition also claimed that the bill was “self-serving” (zifei fangan
自肥方案). Antonio Ng Kuok-cheong, another directly-elected legislator, al-
leged that Fernando Chui, the present CE and also the former Secretary for
Social Affairs and Culture, would immediately receive more than 6 million
patacas if the bill was passed. (11) Furthermore, the Macao Civil Servants As-
sociation challenged this bill as giving “benefits to the top instead of front-
line civil servants” (feishang shouxia 肥上瘦下 ), because only nine top
officials would enjoy the benefits. (12)
In addition, the article granting the CE immunity from criminal charges
during his or her tenure recalled painful memories of the scandal of Ao Man-
long, the former Secretary for Transport and Public Works, who was jailed
for taking bribes. Jose Pereira Coutinho, a directly-elected legislator, an-
nounced that immunity could not be considered an official prerequisite and
would put officials above the law. (13)
Last but not least, it is critically important to note that the Xinhua News
Agency, the state press agency of the Chinese government, published an
article comparing the officials’ retirement benefits in Hong Kong and Macao
and asking (1) whether it was too generous for high-ranking MSAR officials
to receive 10 million patacas after leaving office, (2) why the MSAR gov-
ernment did not conduct any consultation, and (3) how to handle the case
of a CE who broke the law while in office. (14) In addition, Global Times, a
newspaper under the official People’s Daily, released a series of articles re-
porting on the anger of the Macao public. The Beijing government obviously
did not support the benefits package.
Actions against the package
On 25 May 2014, 20,000 citizens marched in front of the government
headquarters (police put the figure at 7,000). Protesters held signs written
in Chinese, English, and Portuguese with statements such as “No Shame at
All,” “Abuse of Power,” “The Government Neglects Public Opinion,” “Officials
Care for Themselves,” and “Ali Baba and the 40 Thieves.” They also yelled,
“Withdraw!” and urged the government to retract the package. (15) Some
protesters even called on the CE to step down if he failed to kill off this con-
troversial bill. 
Because of the outbreak of this massive protest, three members from both
the AL and the Executive Council, Chan Meng-kam, Cheang Chi-keong, and
Leonel Alberto Alves, hosted a joint press conference to announce their rec-
ommendation calling for further committee-level discussions on the bill.
Florinda Chan Lai-man, the Secretary for Administration and Justice, imme-
diately released a statement that the government supported their sugges-
tion of re-analysis. However, the organisers emphasised that they were
calling for “retraction” rather than “re-analysis.” (16)
On 27 May, 7,000 people surrounded the AL at the peak of the sit-in
protest (police put the number at 4,900). Finally, 31 out of 32 attending
legislators (excluding the president) supported the government’s proposal
calling on the committee to re-examine the bill. After two days, the CE
called a press conference to announce the scrapping of the contentious
compensation bill. (17) Fernando Chui further insisted that the government
would advance with a new proposal “only with the people’s agreement”
and promised to utilise multiple channels such as the media, lectures, ex-
planatory sessions, and reflections from the AL in order to receive feed-
back. (18)
Macao Conscience, led by educated young people and one of the core or-
ganisers of the march, described Chui’s concession as a “small victory” in
Macao for the civil rights movement, because the underlying problem with
the MSAR government is the undemocratic political system itself. (19) Fol-
lowing this incident, the organisation hoped that citizens would pay more
attention to Macao’s political system and to the fact that Macao needs uni-
versal suffrage to elect all AL members and the CE. They also organised fo-
rums and rallies to help residents understand that democracy is the ultimate
key to dealing with governance issues. (20)
Two critical challenges faced by democrats
Although the bill was ultimately withdrawn, the incident clearly reflected
two main political challenges. Firstly, according to Jason Chao Teng-hei, one
of the core members of Macao Conscience, the legislature is apparently fail-
ing to monitor the government. (21) Secondly, Sulu Sou, another core mem-
ber, condemned the mainstream media for being “harmonised” (bei hexie
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被 河 蟹 ), or censored, by the authorities. Newspapers only provided a
“stamp-sized” corner for them while offering whole pages to report on din-
ner gatherings of pro-Beijing associations. The TV news offered only around
10 seconds to report their campaigns, but around one minute to describe
the activities of pro-government organisations. (22)
During the handover negotiation period, the Portuguese government did
not insist on the democratisation of Macao due to consideration of the Chi-
nese market. (23) Thus, compared with Hong Kong, the Macao Basic Law clearly
reflects the Beijing government’s lack of enthusiasm for promoting democ-
ratisation. According to Hong Kong Basic Law Article 45, the ultimate goal is
the election of the CE by universal suffrage upon nomination by a generally
representative body. However, there is no such commitment in Macao. (24) In
the current tenure, the Basic Law stipulates that the CE be elected by a 400-
person electoral committee, thus marginalising the general public. 
Similarly, there has been no statement, as in Hong Kong, that the ultimate
aim is the election of all legislators by universal suffrage (Article 68). The
Macao Basic Law only states that the majority of members of the AL shall
be “elected.” (25) In fact, the composition of the AL is formulated through
both democratic and undemocratic methods. Currently, it is formed by di-
rect election (elected by all registered voters), indirect election (through ne-
gotiation and compromise by traditional associations), and appointment
(nominated by the CE). (26) Table 1 reveals the composition and distribution
of the pan-democratic camp in the AL. (27)
Obviously, the AL electoral system does not favour the opposition. First,
indirect elections are dominated by four constituencies: (1) business inter-
ests, (2) labour interests, (3) professional interests, and (4) charity, culture,
education, and sports interests. Each registered social group coordinates
and negotiates among themselves to nominate pro-government candidates.
In reality, most of Macao’s associations are dominated by pro-China forces,
and the opposition is barred from taking part due to inadequate re-
sources. (28) In the direct election, a proportional representation system with
the new D’Hondt formula has been adopted. (29) The pro-democratic camp
received around 30% of the vote and gained four out of 14 directly elected
seats in 2013: Antonio Ng, Au Kam-san, Jose Pereira Coutinho, and Leong
Veng-chai. More significantly, the appointment system is still maintained
in order to provide stable support for the government. Under this scheme,
there is no system of checks and balances between the executive and leg-
islative branches. From 1999 to 2013, nearly all 187 of the government’s
motions were passed without challenge. 
Secondly, the phenomenon of self-censorship is obvious in Macao’s media
industry. The subsidisation of all Chinese and Portuguese newspapers allows
the authorities to put pressure on reporters. As a consequence, independent
investigations monitoring the government are rare, and pro-Beijing views
dominate news reports. (30) For instance, during the electoral reform consul-
tation period in 2012, a group of reporters held a “black shirt campaign”
because editors only allowed articles supporting government proposals
while removing comments questioning the political reform package. (31)
Overall, the opposition forces cannot rely on the AL and mass media to
expose the misconduct of the government and promote their activities. As
Sulu Sou mentioned, “when the legislature and media fail to function ef-
fectively to monitor the government, people will resort to direct action. It
happens everywhere in the world.” (32)
Explaining the success of the anti-welfare
package campaign: Youth-driven online
activism in Macao
Existing literature has long recognised that the political opposition and
civil society are weak in checking the government’s performance and pro-
moting democratic values in Macao. (33) Although there are five thousand
social groups in Macao, almost all categorise themselves as “love China, love
Macao” (aiguo aiao 愛國愛澳) organisations. Many of these groups are en-
meshed in corresponding networks in China, and their immediate goal is to
promote the political stability of Macao by legitimising government policies. 
Macao Conscience was established in 2012, and most of the founding
members are locally-born youngsters with a strong sense of belonging to
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Macao together with relatively high education levels and advanced IT
knowledge. They regularly wear t-shirts and carry signs with the slogan “Sav-
ing Our Government by Ourselves” (ziji zhengfu ziji jiu 自己政府自己救) in
their organised events. But they could only mobilise around 50 participants
in their first protest against an increase in bus fares. By gaining experience,
they developed their use of social networking channels to deliver their mes-
sages, train up their mobilising skills, and leverage the changing political cul-
ture among young people. This resulted in the recent campaign attracting
20,000 participants, even in a relatively conservative city such as Macao. 
According to recent findings, tertiary school students in Macao put increas-
ing emphasis on a fair and open election system rather than the “sweeteners”
offered by the government. (34) Some of them are willing to engage in social
movements in order to fight for a democratic system. In the previous expe-
rience of mass protests such as the annual Labour Day and Handover Day
demonstrations, significant youth participation was not evident. Taiwan’s
“Sunflower Movement” in early 2014 and Hong Kong’s “Anti-national Edu-
cation Campaign” in 2012 became central references in Macao’s current cam-
paign. Sulu Sou highlighted that the experience of studying in Taiwan also
taught him how to design memorable slogans and gestures, use non-violent
tactics, and divide tasks into different categories such as security and first-
aid services. (35) More significantly, they realised how to utilise the Internet for
promotion and mobilisation when the mainstream media was “harmonised.”
The Internet is undoubtedly a new platform for political discourse. (36) Sulu
Sou commented that the success of the campaign should be attributed to
the changing political culture of the young through the Internet. The Inter-
net has created a platform for youngsters to criticise the government and
even mobilise people to protest. In fact, the campaign calling for protest
lasted only five days, and the Internet is probably the most efficient way to
connect with supporters. The announcement of the campaign on Facebook
attracted close to 700 Likes, and 7,000 users declared they would attend
the event. Moreover, a Facebook page adorned with a picture of a pig with
the slogan “Greedy officials’ severance benefits are really excessive” at-
tracted more than 1,500 Likes and was shared more than 1,100 times. (37)
The supporters spontaneously shared this message, gave their own sugges-
tions to the organisers, such as avoiding violent attacks, and invited their
friends and relatives to attend as well. Some supporters even designed their
own images with messages such as “Macao people save Macao” in the
hopes of mobilising more participants. 
Indeed, Sulu Sou noticed that most of the participants were young people
and civil servants characterised as not only educated, but also, more im-
portantly, Internet-active. (38) Many youngsters and professionals recognised
the problem of self-censored media and shifted to online “alternative news”
sources such as “All About Macao” (lunjin meiti 論盡媒體) and online news-
paper such as “Macao Concealers” (aiman ribao 愛瞞日報) in order to access
“unreported” information. (39) By doing so, new media enabled Macao Con-
science to explain the controversy over the welfare package and mobilise
objectors to take part in the protests.
Besides accessing information, exchange and creation of information are
also significant on the Internet. Bill Chou Kwok-ping, another core member
of Macao Conscience, stated that digital networks offered less powerful in-
dividuals the chance to band together, creating a favourable atmosphere to
criticise official misconduct. Internet users, especially the younger genera-
tion, use online platforms to share their displeasure regarding existing social
problems such as government-business collusion, the overload of mainland
visitors, unaffordable flat prices, the one-sidedly gaming-driven economy,
and undemocratic political system, expressing views that are rarely pre-
sented in mainstream media. (40) The Internet has created a platform for
users to express their viewpoints in a non-hierarchical, participatory, and
inclusive way that may attract more supporters to get involved in protest
activities. Users can join together to defend their rights and pressure the
authorities to be more responsible and transparent. 
In a relatively radical way, some opposition associations even mobilised
supporters to engage in “one person, one letter campaigns” and send mes-
sage bombs to the Facebook accounts of some non-directly elected legis-
lators to encourage them to veto the bill. Some of them were forced to shut
down their accounts due to the sudden message bombing attacks. (41) As a
whole, as Au Kam-san concluded, it was believable that youth utilisation of
the Internet for mobilisation has become an important weapon for future
civil rights movements. (42)
Subsequent to this incident, Macao Conscience, Open Macao Society, and
Macao Youth Dynamics formed a joint committee and launched a civil ref-
erendum from 24 to 31 August 2014 in both physical and online voting.
Drawing references from Occupy Central’s June poll in Hong Kong, the civil
referendum asked locals (1) if they wanted universal suffrage at the next
CE election, and (2) if they had confidence in the incumbent CE, Fernando
Chui. (43) Overall, 8,688 residents participated, among whom 95.06% wanted
universal suffrage and 89.34% said they did not trust Fernando Chui. (44)
However, on 31 August, Fernando Chui was unsurprisingly re-elected with
95.96% of the vote in the 400-member CE Election Committee, and he fur-
ther reiterated that the civil referendum was not in accordance with the
Basic Law and had no legal basis at all. (45)
The Beijing government likewise condemned the civil referendum as “il-
legal and invalid.” During the campaign, Jason Chao and four volunteer ac-
tivists were detained by the police for allegedly violating the personal data
protection law, while two journalists from Macao Concealers were arrested
on suspicion of illegal use of official badges, logos, and uniforms. (46) Overall,
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the position of the Beijing government is quite clear: it tolerated the protests
against the welfare package, but when protesters’ demands shifted to more
general terms of democratic reform, the events were harshly condemned
and suppressed. This “red line” was adopted not only in Hong Kong, which
recently has been holding “occupy movements” to fight for democracy, but
also in Macao, even with a large pro-Beijing population.
Conclusion
The MSAR government introduced a bill for a welfare package for outgoing
CEs and top officials. However, as it was drafted without consulting the
public, the government attracted criticism for its lack of transparency. Worse
still, the perks bill was considered to grant excessively generous benefits to
the CE and other top officials, as well as granting immunity from criminal
charges during the CE’s tenure. Criticism of self-serving motivations drew
20,000 citizens to the streets on 25 May 2014 demanding that the bill be
withdrawn, setting a record for the largest demonstration since Macao’s
handover. The unprecedented forces successfully persuaded the government
to drop the bill and alerted it to the public’s awareness of political affairs.
Overall, this incident weakened not only the legitimacy of the MSAR, but
also the merit of Fernando Chui’s re-election. Although Chui was unsurpris-
ingly re-elected with 95.96% of the vote on 31 August 2014, this further
exposed the problems of an undemocratic system. The discussion in this
paper sheds light on the significant social movement that has grown out
of this context of disillusionment.
As the mainstream media are criticised for performing self-censorship,
some people, especially young people and professionals, have shifted to
reading “online media.” With a platform to share and criticise the govern-
ment’s performance, which is not regularly monitored in the mainstream
media, the political culture has changed. Young people brought up in a rel-
atively affluent and educated society have developed a strong sense of po-
litical conscience and rising demands for democratic government in Macao.
According to recent findings, tertiary students in Macao attach great im-
portance to a fair and open electoral system, and some are willing to engage
in social movements to fight for what they want. (47)
However, the Beijing government’s “red line” is clearly drawn. The Beijing
government tolerated protests related to non-democratic issues such as
the welfare package, but when the nature of the demands shifted to dem-
ocratic reforms, the events were rapidly condemned and even suppressed.
This strategy was adopted not only in Hong Kong, but also in Macao. 
Based on the experience of Hong Kong, it must be acknowledged that
fighting China for democracy is a formidably difficult task. Even so, pro-
democracy groups such as Macao Conscience are still committed to sus-
taining their work of exposing the limitations of the current political system,
strengthening online campaigns, and highlighting the importance of democ-
racy by organising various activities. (48) This resulted in their civil referendum
asking local residents their views on universal suffrage and confidence in
Fernando Chui. Ultimately, around 8,700 residents participated. Some op-
timists view the recent campaigns as a political awakening, as the people
of Macao are no longer compliant, but Macao Conscience is convinced that
building a sense of democracy is a long-term process. In the organisation’s
opinion, Macao’s fight can only be regarded as a “full victory” when real
democracy is born.
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